Tanisha Systems v. Chandra by Northern District of Georgia
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
 
TANISHA SYSTEMS, INC., :  
 :  
Plaintiff, :  
 :  
v. :  
 :  
PRAKASH CHANDRA, : 
: 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 
1:15-CV-2644-AT 
 :  
Defendant. :  
 
ORDER 
 This case arises from a broken relationship between a former employer and 
employee.  Plaintiff Tanisha Systems, Inc. (“Tanisha Systems”) claims that 
Defendant Prakash Chandra, a disgruntled ex-employee, conspired with a fellow 
ex-employee to create an online smear campaign targeting Tanisha Systems.  
According to the Complaint, Chandra and a co-conspirator not named as a 
defendant used the Internet as a platform to disseminate false statements about 
Plaintiff with the intent to tarnish the company’s reputation and hinder its ability 
to retain current and prospective employees.  Plaintiff advances claims for 
tortious interference and defamation.  Pending before the Court is Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”).  [Doc. 5].  For the reasons set forth below, the 
Court GRANTS IN PART1 and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion. 
                                                 
1 The Court only grants Defendant’s Motion with respect to Plaintiff’s request for punitive 
damages for its defamation claims, and insofar as the Complaint seeks to allege an independent 
cause of action for conspiracy (as opposed to a theory of liability for the underlying torts). 
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 Although the Court is largely denying Defendant’s Motion, a few general 
observations – and concerns – about this case are in order.  Plaintiff’s Complaint 
passes the threshold of plausibility under Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a) – but only barely.  
The Complaint contains significant problems which are almost certain to rear 
their head at summary judgment, trial, or before.   
 First, much of the misconduct alleged is premised on the existence of a 
conspiracy between Defendant Chandra and an alleged co-conspirator.  But that 
co-conspirator is not named here.  Although a co-conspirator is not a necessary 
party to a tort lawsuit, MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 946 
(11th Cir. 1999) (abrogated on other grounds) (citing Pasco Int’l (London) Ltd. v. 
Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 501 n.10 (7th Cir. 1980) for the “‘established 
principle that co-conspirators are not indispensable parties”)), the co-
conspirator’s total absence from this case gives the Court pause since it is the 
Complaint’s allegations regarding the conduct of the Defendant’s non-party co-
conspirator that are the most “plausible.”   
 The allegations themselves contain more than a hint of vagueness – they 
contain enough factual material to get past the hurdle of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
but not by much.  For example, the Complaint is unclear as to which Tanisha 
Systems employees breached their confidentiality agreements after being 
solicited by defendant, and what kinds of information they divulged.  Similarly, 
the Complaint alleges a conspiracy to defame, but leaves open much of how 
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Chandra worked with his co-conspirator to develop and spread the content of the 
allegedly defamatory blog post.   
 Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that the Communications 
Decency Act does not apply to most (and perhaps all) of Defendant’s conduct in 
forwarding the blog post and providing commentary supportive of its contents. 
 In sum, this is a Complaint with problems.  But it meets the pleading 
standards of the Federal Rules.     
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  If a pleading does not contain 
allegations that support recovery under any recognizable legal theory, then it fails 
to state a claim.  5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2002); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009).  In essence, the pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
The Court construes the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor and accepts the 
allegations of facts therein as true.  See Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th 
Cir. 1993).  The plaintiff is not required to provide “detailed factual allegations” to 
survive dismissal, but the “obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] 
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
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In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should identify 
conclusions, which are not entitled to the assumption of truth.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
679.  “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 
must be supported by factual allegations.”  Id.  at 679.  Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 
suffice.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the 
Court must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and the 
Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation”). 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Tanisha Systems is a provider of custom application development 
and end-to-end information technology (IT) services.2  (Compl. ¶ 2.)  Tanisha 
Systems hired Defendant Chandra in March 2010 as a computer programmer 
analyst.  (Compl. ¶ 10.)  Chandra’s employment was at-will (Compl. ¶ 13), and his 
continued employment was “dependent upon satisfactory performance.”  (Compl. 
¶ 12.)  Per his employment agreement, Chandra could receive some bonus 
compensation “paid at the discretion of the company,” subject to Tanisha 
Systems’ “right to alter or eliminate any bonus plan at any time.”  (Compl. ¶ 12.)  
Chandra’s employment agreement also contained a confidentiality provision 
prohibiting him from disclosing confidential company information during and 
following his employment with Tanisha Systems.  (Compl. ¶ 14; Ex. A.)   
                                                 
2 For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts as true facts alleged in Plaintiff’s 
Complaint, consistent with the standard above.   
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 On or about August 30, 2011, Chandra communicated his resignation to 
Tanisha Systems (Compl. ¶ 16) after a dispute about his bonus compensation.  
(Compl. ¶ 15.)  The parting was not amicable.  Thus, Chandra, in cooperation with 
another disgruntled ex-employee, Ashwini Jayaprakash, (Compl. ¶ 6) allegedly 
devised a joint scheme to harm Tanisha Systems and punish its perceived 
wrongdoings.  (Compl. ¶¶ 73, 74.)  The “primary objective” of this plan was to 
“disrupt [Tanisha Systems’] ability to hire and retain employees,” and “ruin the 
company’s reputation.”  (Compl. ¶ 74.)  To achieve their objective, the co-
conspirators allegedly:  
• Compiled a “hit list” of current and former employees of Tanisha 
Systems (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37); 
• contacted as many current and former employees as possible on the 
hit list to pressure them into “join[ing] [the] conspiracy” (Compl. ¶ 
20) and to enlist them in the plan (Compl. ¶ 19);  
• encouraged current and former employees to divulge confidential 
information that Chandra might use to harm Tanisha Systems 
(Compl. ¶ 19); 
• used confidential information divulged by current and former 
employees to “disparage and misrepresent facts to as many 
prospective and current employees as possible”  (Compl. ¶ 20); and 
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• used social media and the Internet to spread defamatory statements 
about Tanisha Systems (Compl. ¶ 77) and “to disrupt current 
employment relationships and prospective ones.”  (Compl. ¶ 30.)   
Chandra and Jayaprakash’s efforts resulted in the creation of a blog titled 
www.tanishasystemsucks.wordpress.com.  (Compl. ¶¶ 52, 53, 54.)  Tanisha 
Systems alleges that the blog’s posts contain a number of defamatory comments, 
including: 
• “. . . nobody gets out of this company without being terminated or 
blackmailed to resign;” 
• Tanisha Systems “will take your hard earned money and tell you they 
will give it back as bonus;”  
• “When I wasn’t getting what I was promised and had to fight to get 
my correct salary I was terminated;” 
• Tanisha Systems broke a promise to Chandra to pay him “balance 
money” of 80% of his client billings.  
(Compl. ¶ 56.) 
The blog post was ultimately authored and published in Jayaprakash’s 
name. (Compl. ¶¶ 52.)  However, Tanisha Systems alleges that Chandra and 
Jayaprakash by jointly developing the hit list of former and current employees, 
requested confidential information from the individuals on the hit list, and 
combined to use social media to infect search results concerning Tanisha 
Systems.  (Compl. ¶¶ 74-77.) Tanisha Systems also alleges that Chandra 
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commented on the blog site, “vouching for the correctness of the content by 
praising the author as . . . having shown ‘the real picture of Tanisha Systems,’” 
(Compl. ¶¶ 57) and emailed the blog post’s link to Tanisha Systems employees on 
his “hit list,” urging them to forward the blog and share it widely.  (Compl. ¶¶ 59) 
(Compl. Ex. B.)  In essence, Tanisha Systems alleges that Chandra both helped 
create the blog by virtue of his participation in the larger scheme to harm Tanisha 
Systems, and extended the reach of the allegedly defamatory blog post by both 
disseminating it and by posing as an independent commenter who verified what 
Jayaprakash had written.   
 Tanisha Systems claims that as a result of Chandra and Jayaprakash’s 
actions, it “has lost revenue, has experienced higher costs associated with hiring, 
and has suffered injury to its reputation” (Compl. ¶ 24), and that “at least one 
potential employee explicitly credited Chandra’s misrepresentations as his or her 
reason for looking elsewhere [for employment].”  (Compl. ¶ 22.)   
Tanisha Systems claims that Chandra’s actions amount to tortious 
interference and defamation and seeks compensatory and punitive damages, 
attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief.  Each of Tanisha Systems’ claims will be 
addressed in turn. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Tortious Interference with Contractual and Business 
Relations (Count I) 
 
Tanisha Systems first alleges that Chandra tortiously interfered with its 
contractual and business relations by improperly meddling in Tanisha Systems’ 
current and future employment relationships.  To survive a motion to dismiss, 
Tanisha Systems is required to allege: 
(1) improper action or wrongful conduct by the 
defendant without privilege; (2) the defendant acted 
purposely and with malice with the intent to injure; (3) 
the defendant induced a breach of contractual 
obligations or caused a party or third parties to 
discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business 
relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant’s 
tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the 
plaintiff.   
 
Disaster Servs., Inc. v. ERC P’ship, 492 S.E.2d 526, 528-29 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) 
(citations omitted).  The Court finds that Tanisha Systems has met its pleading 
burden.  
1. Improper Action or Wrongful Conduct 
A core component of a tortious interference claim is “improper action or 
wrongful conduct.”   Chaney v. Harrison & Lynam, LLC, 708 S.E.2d 672, 681 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011).  In other words, a tort must underlie the “interference.”  See 
Hayes v. Irwin, 541 F. Supp. 397, 429 (N.D. Ga. 1982) aff’d, 729 F.2d 1466 (11th 
Cir. 1984) (holding that tortious interference is a wrongful tort).   
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The term “improper action or wrongful conduct” includes any “action that 
generally involves predatory tactics such as physical violence, fraud or 
misrepresentation, defamation, use of confidential information, abusive civil 
suits, and unwarranted criminal prosecutions.”  Fortson v. Brown, 690 S.E.2d 
239, 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); see also Saye v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 670 S.E.2d 
818, 824 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Vurv Tech. LLC v. Kenexa Corp., No. 1:08-CV-
3442-WSD, 2009 WL 2171042, at *9 (N.D. Ga. July 20, 2009).   
For example, in Saye, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s defamation claims, and then also reversed 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim because that claim was 
founded on the defamation claim.  670 S.E.2d at 824.  Similarly, in Vurv Tech, 
the district court held that plaintiff’s tortious interference claim survived 
defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that defendants breached 
their confidentiality agreements with their former employer.  2009 WL 2171042 
at *9. 
Here, Tanisha Systems alleges that Chandra defamed it3 and induced 
disclosure of confidential information. Specifically, Chandra and his co-
conspirator allegedly compiled a “hit list” of current and former employees of 
Tanisha Systems (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37), contacted at least twenty of such employees 
(Compl. ¶ 37) and encouraged them to divulge confidential information (Compl. ¶ 
                                                 
3 The sufficiency of Tanisha’s defamation claim is addressed in Section B of this Order. 
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19).  Chandra also “recruited others and has implemented his plan” to harm 
Tanisha Systems.  This sufficiently alleges wrongful conduct.  
2. Malicious Intent 
Tortious interference also requires malicious intent.  See Renden, Inc. v. 
Liberty Real Estate Ltd. P’ship III, 444 S.E.2d 814, 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).  As 
used here, the term “malice” is construed liberally.  Id. at 817.  It means “any 
unauthorized interference, or any interference without legal justification or 
excuse.”  Id. (citing Arford v. Blalock, 405 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 
For example, in Arford, the court found that “persuading a person to break 
a contract for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff or benefiting the 
defendant at the expense of the plaintiff is a malicious and actionable act if injury 
arises from it.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
Here, Chandra allegedly used confidential company information and 
defamatory statements to persuade current employees of Tanisha Systems to 
break their contracts (including the confidentiality provisions therein) and to 
dissuade prospective employees from entering into contracts. (Compl. ¶ 77.)  And 
Chandra’s purported co-conspirator allegedly claimed that his goal was to 
“screw” Tanisha Systems and force their company out of business.  (Compl. ¶ 73.)  
Thus, under Arford, Tanisha Systems has sufficiently alleged that Chandra’s 
actions are malicious. 
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3. Inducing Breach or a Similar Harm 
Plaintiffs seeking to assert a tortious interference claim must also allege 
that the defendant “induced a breach of contractual obligations or caused a party 
or third parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business 
relationship with the plaintiff.”  Walker v. Gowen Stores LLC, 745 S.E.2d 287, 
289 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).  “Interference with a contractual right or relationship 
need not result in a breach of contract to be actionable.  It is sufficient if the 
invasion retards the performance of duties under the contract or makes the 
performance more difficult or expensive.”  Charles R. Adams III, GEORGIA LAW OF 
TORTS § 33.2 (2014-15 ed.) 
In his motion to dismiss, Chandra argues that Tanisha Systems’ claim that 
he interfered with contractual or prospective business relationships is speculative 
and that Tanisha Systems has not adequately alleged that his conduct actually 
induced any employees to discontinue their employment relationships with 
Tanisha Systems or to breach any contract between the parties.4  (Def’s Mot. to 
Dismiss at 6-7.)   
                                                 
4 The cases cited by Defendant were almost universally decided at the summary judgment stage.  
E.g., Stefano Arts v. Sui, 690 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (granting summary judgment for 
failure to show improper conduct and because defendant was not a stranger to the contract); 
Chaney v. Harrison & Lynam, LLC, 708 S.E.2d 672 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendants when plaintiff failed to demonstrate that unidentified 
customers spoke to alleged defamers); Onbrand Media v. Codex Consulting, Inc., 687 S.E.2d 
168 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (granting summary judgment to defendants because they were not 
strangers to contract); but see Hongjin Sui v. Wu, No. 8:11-cv-37, 2011 WL 1396994 at *6-7 
(M.D. Fla. April 13, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss when defendant alleged that contract 
partner declined several contract options). 
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First, because Tanisha Systems has alleged a claim for interference with 
both contractual and business relations, it need not allege an actual breach of a 
contract – only that “the performance of duties under the contract” were made 
more difficult or expensive.  Charles R. Adams III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 33.2 
(2014-15 ed.)  Tanisha Systems does not only speculate (though there is plenty of 
speculation peppered throughout the Complaint) that Chandra interfered with its 
business relationships.  Tanisha Systems alleges that “at least one potential 
employee explicitly credited Chandra’s misrepresentations as his or her reason 
for looking elsewhere [for employment].”  (Compl. ¶ 22) (emphasis added).  This 
allegation is not particularly strong.  But the Court is unable to locate authority 
requiring Plaintiff to plead the specific identity of this individual at the motion to 
dismiss stage.  Unlike complaints governed by Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b), Tanisha 
Systems’ Complaint need not necessarily state all the particulars of the “who, 
what, when, where, how, and why” of its claims – though it certainly would help. 
  Second, Tanisha Systems has alleged that Chandra induced the breach of 
current employees’ confidentiality agreements, including by speaking to one 
(unnamed) current Tanisha Systems’ employee, targeting that individuals 
employment relationship. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21, 37.)  In his conversation with this 
employee, Chandra allegedy stated he had spoken with twenty other Tanisha 
Systems’ employees.  Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds 
that Tanisha Systems has plausibly alleged that its contractual rights in its 
employees’ confidentiality agreements were breached. 
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4. Damages 
Finally, Tanisha Systems has sufficiently alleged that Chandra’s conduct 
proximately caused its damages.  Tanisha Systems claims that it “has lost 
revenue, has experienced higher costs associated with hiring, and has suffered 
injury to its reputation.”  (Compl. ¶ 24.)  The Court therefore DENIES 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Count I. 
B. Defamation (Count II) 
Tanisha Systems also alleges that Chandra and Jayaprakash published and 
republished a defamatory blog post about Tanisha Systems as part of their 
conspiracy to harm it.  Tanisha Systems alleges a defamation claim based on this 
conduct.  
Chandra argues that because he was not the original author of the blog 
post, and because his comments were made as a user of an interactive computer 
service, he has an absolute defense under the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”).  The Court finds that Tanisha Systems has sufficiently pled a 
defamation claim and that the CDA defense does not apply.  However, the Court 
notes that the CDA immunity provision likely would apply in the event Tanisha 
Systems had failed to allege that Chandra conspired to develop the content in the 
allegedly defamatory blog post. 
 1. Defamation 
Tanisha Systems alleges that Chandra defamed it in two ways:  first, by 
commenting on and supporting Jayaprakash’s allegedly defamatory blog post 
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and second, by acting as a co-conspirator with Jayaprakash in the creation of the 
blog post by virtue of Chandra’s alleged assistance in collecting “confidential 
information . . . to use as fodder for their widely disseminated 
misrepresentations,” and in jointly “infect[ing] any search results concerning 
Tanisha Systems with false, malicious, and defamatory commercial statements.”  
(Compl. ¶¶ 76-77.)  The Court does not reach the issue of Chandra’s own 
comments, e-mails, and postings.  This is because Tanisha Systems has 
sufficiently alleged that Defendant Chandra conspired with Jayaprakash to create 
the allegedly defamatory blog post at http://tanishasystemssucks.wordpress.com 
(“the blog post”). 
Defamation has four elements: “(1) a false and defamatory statement 
concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) 
fault by the defendant amounting at least to negligence; and (4) special harm or 
the actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm.”  1524948 Alberta 
Ltd. v. Lee, No. 1:10-CV-02735-RWS, 2011 WL 2899385, at *8 (N.D. Ga. July 15, 
2011) (citing Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Pardue, 713 S.E.2d 456, 460 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2011)).  Tanisha Systems has sufficiently pled each element.   
First, Tanisha Systems has alleged that the blog post contains false and 
defamatory statements.  (Compl. ¶¶ 55, 56.)  While some of the content of the 
blog post are plainly hyperbolic statements of opinion that are not traditionally 
actionable, other content is more factual in nature.  For example, the blog post 
states that Tanisha Systems falsely promises to pay employees bonus money that 
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in fact it does not pay.  (Compl. ¶ 56.)  Under Georgia law, a plaintiff may seek to 
recover for defamation when a defendant makes allegedly false statements that 
the plaintiff engaged in fraud or fraud-like conduct.  American Southern Ins. 
Group, Inc. v. Goldstein, 660 S.E.2d 810, 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (statements 
that insurance agent had been fired for misappropriating funds were actionable 
as slander per se); Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, 709 F. Supp. 
1563, 1580-81 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (denying summary judgment despite defendants’ 
attempts to show alleged truthfulness of statements that nurse illegally practiced 
medicine and was “poorly trained as a nurse-midwife.”)5 
Tanisha Systems has also sufficiently alleged that these statements are 
unprivileged and that they were communicated to a third party.  First, they were 
posted on a public blog on the internet, which plainly is publication.  Chandra’s e-
mail that forwarded the blog post was also republication6.  Deal v. Builders 
Transport, Inc., 385 S.E. 2d 293, 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Mitan v. A. Neumann 
& Associates, LLC, No. 08-cv-6154, 2010 WL 4782771 at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 
2010) (forwarding an e-mail is republication). 
Second, these statements were unprivileged because they were allegedly 
made with malice.  1524948 Alberta Ltd., 2011 WL 2899385 at *8 (“[P]roof that 
                                                 
5 Chandra claims that at least some of these statements are substantially true.  See Def.’s Mot. to 
Dismiss at 20-21.  Resolution of the truth or falsity of these statements is plainly inappropriate 
at the motion to dismiss stage. 
6 As discussed herein, if Plaintiff fails to prove a conspiracy between Chandra and Jayaprakash 
to publish defamatory comments in the blog or elsewhere, it is very likely that Plaintiff’s 
defamation claims will fail, because republication by forwarding an e-mail (along with a few 
supportive comments that are not defamatory absent context) is protected under the CDA’s 
immunity provisions. 
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the defendant acted with actual malice in making the statement . . . defeats the 
defense of privilege”) (citations omitted).  Here, Tanisha Systems has alleged that 
Chandra and Jayaprakash acted “purposely, maliciously, and with the intent to 
injure Tanisha Systems.”  (Compl. ¶ 73.)  Specifically, Jayaprakash stated that his 
goal was to “screw” the company and put it out of business.  (See Compl. ¶ 73.)  
Even without Jayaprakash’s statement, the allegations of the complaint support 
the inference that Chandra (rightfully or wrongfully) wished to injure Tanisha 
Systems.  At the motion to dismiss stage, this is sufficient to allege actual malice.   
Tanisha Systems has also alleged actionable harm.  “[D]efamation 
includes, inter alia, ‘[m]aking charges against another in reference to his trade, 
office or profession, calculated to injure him therein . . .’” Id. (citing Strange v. 
Henderson, 477 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Ga.Ct.App.1996) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51–5–
4(a)(3))).  “If such a statement is made, the defamation is actionable per se and 
damage is inferred.”  1524948 Alberta Ltd., 2011 WL 2899385 at *9 (internal 
citations omitted).  The statements made in the blog post assert that “Tanisha 
Systems is not a genuine company; that it will terminate and threaten its 
employees illegally; that it will harass its employees; and that it commits wage 
theft.”  (Compl. ¶ 5.)  The statements adversely refer to Tanisha Systems’ 
performance as a trade or profession and are therefore actionable as defamation 
per se. 
Finally, Tanisha Systems has also sufficiently alleged that Chandra 
conspired with Jayaprakash to defame it.  Conspiracy to defame is recognized as 
Case 1:15-cv-02644-AT   Document 15   Filed 12/04/15   Page 16 of 25
 17 
a cause of action in Georgia.  Turnage v. Kasper, 704 S.E. 2d 842, 854 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2010) (recognizing claim of conspiracy to slander when “slanderous words 
spoken by one party . . . [uttered] with the consent of the other party and in 
furtherance of a common design and purpose”); Kimball v. Better Bus Bureau, 
613 Fed. Appx. 821, 825-26 (11th Cir. 2015) (reversing district court’s application 
of fraudulent joinder doctrine because plaintiff had sufficiently alleged 
conspiracy to commit libel under Georgia law); Pacific & Southern Co., Inc. v. 
Montgomery, 210 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. 1974) (question for the jury as to whether 
television station conspired with an individual consumer to defame a business). 
The Complaint is replete with references to the joint nature of the allegedly 
defamatory statements at issue in the blog post.  (Compl. ¶¶ 72-77 (describing 
joint plan to ruin Tanisha System’s “commercial reputation”).)  Under the above 
authorities, Tanisha Systems has met its pleading burden.   
2. CDA Immunity  
The Court must next address Defendant’s arguments that he is immune 
from liability under the Communications Decency Act.  “The majority of federal 
courts have interpreted the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to any 
cause of action that would make service providers liable for information 
originating with a third-party user of the service.’”  Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (collecting circuit cases). 
The CDA immunity provision provides that (1) “[n]o provider or user” of 
(2) “an interactive computer service” is to be treated as the publisher or speaker 
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of any information (3) “provided by another information content provider.” 47 
U.S.C.. § 230(c)(1).7  Essentially, “providers and users of interactive computer 
services” are immunized from liability “when the defamatory or obscene material 
is ‘provided’ by someone else.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2003); Internet Brands v. Jape, 760 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Dimeo 
v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006)).  The Court rejects Plaintiff’s 
argument that the CDA does not apply to Chandra’s actions in forwarding via e-
mail the allegedly defamatory and adding his own statements of approval.  It is 
only because Tanisha Systems has alleged that Chandra conspired with 
Jayaprakash to defame it that it evades the CDA immunity provision.  
  i.  Chandra “Used” an Interactive Computer Service 
The Court assumes that Chandra is a (1) user of (2) an interactive computer 
service.  With respect to (1), his use of e-mail and the commenting features of a 
blog site plainly constitute “use” under the CDA.  See Directory Assistants, 884 F. 
Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D. Va. 2012) (“[t]he action of compiling information from a 
website and e-mailing that information to others clearly constitutes use of that 
website and its services.”); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 526-27 (Ca. 2006).   
With respect to (2), courts routinely treat websites as an interactive 
computer service.  See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
                                                 
7 The CDA’s immunity provision serves “to promote the continued development of the Internet 
and other interactive computer services and other interactive media,” 47 U.S.C.. § 230(b)(1), and 
“to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  47 U.S.C.. § 
230(b)(2).   
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Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (website where subscribers 
can post housing opportunities).  Blogs are treated no differently.  United States 
v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D. Md. 2011) (describing a blog as a website 
which operates “like a bulletin board and contains whatever material its sponsor 
decides to post.”)  Chandra thus satisfies the first two elements of CDA immunity. 
The remaining question to be answered is whether Chandra published 
information provided by “another” information content provider. 
ii.  Chandra Developed the Defamatory Content 
The CDA only provides a defense to those who pass along information 
provided by “another” content provider.  47 U.S.C.. § 230(c)(1).  In other words, 
Chandra can be held liable for the publication (and for his republication via e-
mail) of the blog post if he was responsible “in whole or in part” for the creation 
or development of the post, because that information was not from “another” 
content provider.   
Tanisha Systems does not allege that Chandra directly authored or 
published the blog post.  And Chandra’s “adoption” and “vouching” for the blog 
post (by stating in the blog comments section that it shows “the real picture” of 
Plaintiff) and his forwarding of the blog link are, without more, insufficient to 
show he helped develop or create the content of the blog post.  Internet Brands v. 
Jape, 760 S.E.2d 1,4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (“the test is not whether the 
objectionable content was ‘endorsed,’ but instead whether the content was 
‘independently created or developed by third-party users.’”); Directory 
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Assistants, Inc. v. Supermedia, LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d, 446, 451 (E.D. Va. 2012) 
(“a user of an interactive computer service who finds and forwards via e-mail that 
content posted online in an interactive computer service by others is immune 
from liability”).  So far, so good for Chandra.  
However, these two facts are not dispositive, because a defendant who 
“materially contrib[utes] to [the statement’s] alleged unlawfulness” is not entitled 
to CDA immunity, even if he did not directly author the statements.  Fair 
Housing Council v. San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1167-68 (9th Cir. 2008).  In Fair Housing Council, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
website could be responsible for fair housing violations in its users’ profile pages, 
because it solicited improper questions from those users.  Thus “every such [user] 
page [was] a collaborative effort between [the website] and the subscriber.”  Id. at 
1166.  The facts of Fair Housing are significantly different than those alleged 
here.  However, the principle of that case is that a defendant cannot use the CDA 
to evade liability for defamatory content he helped create, because that content 
was not truly provided by “another” independent content provider.  That 
principle is sound and applies here. 
Tanisha Systems has sufficiently8 pled that Chandra materially contributed 
to the development of the blog post.  Chandra allegedly developed a “hit list” of 
employees from which Chandra and Jayaprakash “request[ed] confidential 
information to . . . use as fodder for their widely disseminated 
                                                 
8 But not by much. 
Case 1:15-cv-02644-AT   Document 15   Filed 12/04/15   Page 20 of 25
 21 
misrepresentations.”  (Compl. ¶¶ 75, 77.)  The purported co-conspirators then 
allegedly “use[d] social media and blog postings to infect any search results 
concerning Tanisha Systems with false, malicious, and defamatory” statements.  
(Id.)  Drawing all inferences (generously) in Tanisha System’s favor, it appears 
that Tanisha Systems alleges that Jayaprakash and Chandra operated as a team 
to create the defamatory blog post at issue and to reinforce its impact by having 
Chandra post supportive remarks in the guise of an allegedly independent 
commenter.  This kind of assistance plausibly suggests that Chandra “created or 
developed” the information “in whole or in part.”  Fair Housing, 521 F.3d at 1166; 
see also Parisi v. Sinclair, 774 F. Supp. 2d 310, 317 (D.D.C. 2011) (plaintiff’s 
allegations did not overcome CDA immunity because plaintiff did not allege 
defendant solicited, encouraged, or communicated with the original source of 
defamatory statements); Barrett, 146 P.3d at 530 (“in a conspiracy to defame . . 
[the] parties themselves [are not] authentically independent”) (concurrence).9  
After all, it would make little sense to allow an individual to work in concert with 
another to defame someone, but allow him to disclaim liability because he 
worked behind the scenes, did not initially publish the defamatory statement he 
helped create, and only “passed along” the defamatory statement once it was out 
in the air. 
                                                 
9 The Court offers no opinion on the likelihood of these allegations, but does note that if Tanisha 
Systems fails to prove that Chandra did more to contribute to the defamatory blog posting than 
merely echoing it in his comments and forwarding it to friends, it faces a tough road ahead in 
this litigation with respect to its defamation claim.    
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C. Attorneys’ Fees (Count IV) 
Tanisha Systems also asserts a “claim” for statutory attorneys’ fees 
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.  This is better framed as a request for relief.  The 
Court therefore construes Defendant’s Motion as a motion to strike this request.   
Under Section 13-6-11, a plaintiff who has specially pleaded that defendant 
has acted in bad faith may be entitled to attorney’s fees.  Evidence that a 
defendant committed an intentional tort is sufficient to show bad faith.  Bunch v. 
Byington, 664 S.E.2d 842, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“Every intentional tort 
invokes a species of bad faith and entitles a person . . . [to] attorneys fees.”))  For 
the reasons set forth above, Tanisha Systems has sufficiently pled tortious 
interference and defamation, both intentional torts.  Accordingly, the Court 
DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees.  
D. Punitive Damages 
Tanisha Systems has requested relief of punitive damages under O.C.G.A. § 
51-5-11.  Chandra argues that Tanisha Systems is not entitled to punitive damages 
in connection with its defamation claim because Tanisha Systems has not plead 
compliance with Georgia’s retraction demand statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-5-11.  Section 
51-5-11 states that for any civil action for libel, a plaintiff may receive punitive 
damages only where “the plaintiff requested retraction in writing at least seven 
days prior to the filing of the action.”  O.C.G.A. § 51-5-11(a).  If defendant proves 
“[t]hat no request for correction and retraction was made in writing by the 
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plaintiff” O.C.G.A. § 51-5-11(2), then “defendant shall be liable only to pay actual 
damages.”  O.C.G.A. § 51-5-11(2)(c). 
Tanisha Systems concedes that it did not seek a retraction in writing prior 
to the filing of this lawsuit.  (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 22-23.)  
Instead, it alleges that it does not have to and that requesting a retraction in the 
body of the complaint is sufficient.  (Id.)  Tanisha Systems cites no case law to 
support its argument.  (See id.)  Because  O.C.G.A. § 51-5-11 explicitly requires a 
request for retraction in writing at least seven days prior to the filing of the 
action, and because Tanisha Systems did not comply with this requirement, it is 
not entitled to seek punitive damages as to its defamation claim.  Mathis v. 
Cannon, 573 S.E. 2d 376, 385-86 (Ga. 2002) (applying retraction statute to 
comment posted on internet message board and holding that “all libel plaintiffs 
who intend to seek punitive damages [must] [] request a correction or retraction 
before filing their civil action.”)  The Court therefore GRANTS Chandra’s Motion 
with respect to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages for its claims for 
defamation and conspiracy to defame. 
E. Conspiracy 
 Tanisha Systems also pleads an independent claim for civil conspiracy to 
defame and tortuously interfere with business relations.  “Without an underlying 
tort, however, there is no liability for civil conspiracy.”  Rails Corp. v. Huerfano 
River Wind, LLC, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2014).  “In other words, the 
mere existence of a conspiracy does not create a cause of action.”  Id.  (granting 
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dismissal of claim for conspiracy to convert, but denying dismissal of claim for 
conspiracy to engage in fraudulent transfer).  As a result, some courts in this 
district have framed a “claim” for conspiracy as a theory of liability. E.g., 
Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 411 B.R. 805, 870 (N.D. Ga. 2009).   
The Court finds, as discussed herein, that Plaintiff has plausibly (though 
not terribly strongly) alleged the existence of a conspiracy to defame and 
tortuously interfere with its business relations.  See Cook v. Robinson, 116 S.E.2d 
742, 745 (Ga. 1960) (conspiracy may be pleaded in general terms).  However, if 
the underlying claims for defamation and tortuous interference fail at any 
juncture in this case, the conspiracy “claim” – whether construed as a claim 
founded on the underlying torts or a theory of liability - will fail too.  The Court 
therefore DISMISSES Count III insofar as it advances a claim solely for 
conspiracy.  The Court does consider the allegations found in Count III in 
determining the overall sufficiency of the Complaint.  And Plaintiff is permitted 
to proceed on and seek discovery on its theory of liability that Defendant 
conspired to defame it and tortuously interfere with its contractual and business 
relations.       
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES 
IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 5].  The Motion is DENIED as to 
all counts except (1) Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages for its defamation 
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claim, (2) Plaintiff’s Count III insofar as it seeks to advance an independent claim 
for conspiracy.   
Given the weaknesses of the Complaint, the Court DIRECTS Plaintiff to 
provide the following information in its Initial Disclosures, provided in 
conjunction with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a): 
(a)  identify the Tanisha Systems’ employees that it contests have breached 
their confidentiality obligations as a result of Defendant’s alleged conduct; 
(b) identify the nature of the confidential information provided (i.e., trade 
secrets, confidential employment information, or the like); and 
(c)  identify any Tanisha Systems employees who have terminated their 
employment relationship with it as a result of Defendant’s alleged conduct. 
 Finally, as a principal form of relief Tanisha Systems apparently seeks is 
the cessation of Chandra’s alleged conduct, a mediated resolution of this matter 
may well provide the most swift and economically reasonable mode of addressing 
this case for all parties.  Therefore, this matter is REFERRED to the next 
available Magistrate Judge for mediation.  Mediation SHALL conclude no later 
than February 15, 2016.  The parties are DIRECTED to file a status report at the 
conclusion of the mediation indicating whether this matter is resolved.  Discovery 
SHALL be stayed until the conclusion of the mediation. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of December, 2015.  
__________________________________ 
      Amy Totenberg      
             United States District Judge   
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